This is a thought. Trying to put into words a discomfort that I've always felt. This is raw, not very well formulated, and not researched. I'm sure others would have written out the same or similar concerns, in a much better and more rigorous fashion. I hope to revisit sometime and make this better.
Categorical imperative: stop anthropomorphizing animal behaviour.
Premises:
1. Non-human animals exhibit behaviour that strongly suggests cognitive processes. (Highly probably that cognitive processes exist in non-human animals as inferred from intelligent behaviour)
2. The cognitive processes in non-human animals are qualitatively and quantitatively different from those to be found in humans; inferred from differences in brain structure. (caveat: although similarities exist)*
3. If cognitive processes in non-human animals are different from those in humans, their subjective experiences are also qualitatively and quantitatively different.**
4. Thus, their subjective experiences are categorically different from human subjective experiences.
Conclusion:
Therefore, we cannot apply human categories for subjective experience to the subjective experience of non-human animals.
* and ** - in holding that the subjective experience of non-human animals are quantitatively and qualitatively different, I do not hold that (1) they are completely different, nor that (2) they do not have anything like subjective experience. That their subjective experience is different or inaccessible to us is not reason enough to treat them morally different - insofar as our behaviour to them goes.
Coming back, to apply human categories to non-human animals is not just to be factually wrong, but also to be violating the agency of those non-human animals. If such wrong beliefs affect or effect certain actions of ours, those actions can result in consequences that grievously injure the animal or its interests.
Example: Ah, the cat gave me an ugly look. Maybe I should keep away from it.
Example: My dog is feeling sad because it's left out of the festivities, let me give it some good rich food so that he feels good. (when he is actually just scared by the firecrackers, and what he requires is not rich food, which will make him sicker, but darkness and peace)
Example: That elephant looks pitiful and existential. Maybe it's time to put her to sleep.
Are non-human animal's subjective experience accessible to us? Possibly. I would like to think yes, in some ways. For example, I think perhaps pain is a pretty universal feeling. But the emotions and thoughts that follow the experience of pain is bound to be different. But I do not know anything about it to take a stand. I do know that the way is definitely not by anthropomorphizing their experience and behaviour.
Of course, these are all highly speculative.
Categorical imperative: stop anthropomorphizing animal behaviour.
Premises:
1. Non-human animals exhibit behaviour that strongly suggests cognitive processes. (Highly probably that cognitive processes exist in non-human animals as inferred from intelligent behaviour)
2. The cognitive processes in non-human animals are qualitatively and quantitatively different from those to be found in humans; inferred from differences in brain structure. (caveat: although similarities exist)*
3. If cognitive processes in non-human animals are different from those in humans, their subjective experiences are also qualitatively and quantitatively different.**
4. Thus, their subjective experiences are categorically different from human subjective experiences.
Conclusion:
Therefore, we cannot apply human categories for subjective experience to the subjective experience of non-human animals.
* and ** - in holding that the subjective experience of non-human animals are quantitatively and qualitatively different, I do not hold that (1) they are completely different, nor that (2) they do not have anything like subjective experience. That their subjective experience is different or inaccessible to us is not reason enough to treat them morally different - insofar as our behaviour to them goes.
Coming back, to apply human categories to non-human animals is not just to be factually wrong, but also to be violating the agency of those non-human animals. If such wrong beliefs affect or effect certain actions of ours, those actions can result in consequences that grievously injure the animal or its interests.
Example: Ah, the cat gave me an ugly look. Maybe I should keep away from it.
Example: My dog is feeling sad because it's left out of the festivities, let me give it some good rich food so that he feels good. (when he is actually just scared by the firecrackers, and what he requires is not rich food, which will make him sicker, but darkness and peace)
Example: That elephant looks pitiful and existential. Maybe it's time to put her to sleep.
Are non-human animal's subjective experience accessible to us? Possibly. I would like to think yes, in some ways. For example, I think perhaps pain is a pretty universal feeling. But the emotions and thoughts that follow the experience of pain is bound to be different. But I do not know anything about it to take a stand. I do know that the way is definitely not by anthropomorphizing their experience and behaviour.
Of course, these are all highly speculative.
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